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The “New Normal” For Educating Lawyers 
Nicola A. Boothe-Perry* 
I. PREFACE 
“[P]ray will you concern yourself with anything 
else than how we citizens can be made as good as       
possible?”1 
When Socrates posed this question to “statesmen” who “embarked 
upon a public career,” he answered the query indicating that the im-
provement (“as good as possible”) of those under the statesman’s su-
pervision should be the ultimate goal. For the law professor or “states-
person,” the question is instructive. 
The law professor’s role has been defined in tripartite fashion: as 
1) a scholar, 2) a teacher, and 3) a colleague.2 Additional roles of “law-
yer for clients” (an advocate for legal reform)3 “transmitter of infor-
mation” and “keeper of the hierarchy” have also been articulated.4 Yet, 
 
* Associate Professor, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University (“FAMU”), College of Law; 
J.D.: Florida State University College of Law, Cum Laude 1994; B.S.: University of Florida, 
1991.  The author is grateful for the support of the Lutie Lytle Workshop participants and the 
Clinical Law Review Workshop participants for the insightful comments. The author also wishes 
to thank her research assistant, Taisha O’Connor, for her assistance.   
 1.  PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 296 (Edith 
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).  
 2.  Law professors have various roles in and outside the law school community. This ar-
ticle will, however, focus on the law professor’s role within the law school community, extending 
to the outside community only as it specifically relates to the narrowly defined legal profession. 
See generally Jason Ostrom, The Competing Roles of Law Professors, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 539 
(2001) (noting the various roles of law professors); Amy Gajda, The Law Professor as Legal Com-
mentator, 10 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 209 (2004) (discussing law professors’ 
involvement with legal media).  
 3.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 223, 247 (2012) (delineating roles of a law professor towards a goal of identify-
ing the moral and ethical constraints that bear specifically on their participation in scholars’ 
briefs). 
 4.  See, e.g., Maria L. Ciampi, The I and the Thou: A New Dialogue for the Law, 58 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 881, 897 (1990) (As the “keeper of the hierarchy,” the author states that the law 
professor “‘slaps’ the student into the cold reality of the practice of law, communicates that the 
student must prove that the student deserves to be a member of this profession, and teaches the 
student that a ‘hierarchy’ exists in the law which the student must mind and revere.”).  
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when a group of faculty members from a law school were asked the 
question: “[w]ho do we need to be for our students?” there was no par-
ticularized uniformity of the roles that define our vocation.5 The only 
time provided to think about the question was the time between indi-
vidual faculty members’ responses. Without much opportunity for 
forethought, the responses were indicative of each individual’s honest 
belief of his or her obligations as a law professor. The interesting re-
sponses varied from the positive (which were the majority of responses) 
(e.g. enabling the students to “be positive contributions to the com-
munity”; “think critically”; “be intellectually curious”), to an interest-
ing response of “conflicted.”6 These responses provided pause for 
thought, especially as those responses related to not just who faculty 
members wanted to be, but who they should be as law professors. 
By definition, a “professor” is one who “teaches or professes special 
knowledge of an art, sport, or occupation requiring skill.”7 One of the 
most renowned Jewish existentialist philosophers of the twentieth cen-
tury, Martin Buber, believed that teaching is the most important pro-
fession for human society.8 For those who teach laws and legal princi-
ples, Socrates’ rhetorical question suggests that the primary goal is the 
improvement (the “betterment”) of those being taught. But what does 
“teaching” mean to the law professor? Although it is imperative to 
teach “the law”—the substance, the analysis, and the synthesis—does 
the obligation as “teacher” go beyond such traditional “teaching” of 
the substance of the law? Are there obligations to teach other tangible 
and non-tangible skills that have an impact on students and society? 
Are there other obligations to the profession as a whole? Are there 
other aspirational values that should be included in the obligatory du-
ties of a law professor? Are these obligations as a professor height-
ened/increased at a school that specifically targets and attracts students 
from historically underrepresented segments of society? And how do 
these obligations adapt to the “new normal” standards in the legal 
community and society as a whole? 
 
 5.  The question was posed to the faculty of Florida A&M University College of Law 
during a faculty retreat, which the author attended in April 2013.   
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Professor Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/professor (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  
 8.  AUBREY HODES, MARTIN BUBER: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT 124 (1971) (quoting Bu-
ber); see also Ciampi, supra note 4, at 881 (discussing the dialogical relationship in education). 
BOOTHE-PERRY.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  8:57 AM 
53]                                    The “New Normal” for Educating Lawyers  
55 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The term “new normal” has been minted as a shorthand phrase to 
express our “economic instability, societal changes, and business mod-
els in flux.”9 This new normal has many implications for law schools 
and the legal profession as schools cope with decreased enrollment 
numbers,10 law school graduates find the job market slim, law firms 
cope with budgetary restraints, and legal academia battles with issues 
such as tuition and tenure.11 In the midst of these critical changes, law 
schools have to adjust or suffer negative consequences of failing to do 
so.12 
As the law profession and legal academia hasten to adjust to this 
new normal, there is a need for legal academia to address the new nor-
mal by clearly identifying the law professor’s role in this adjustment. 
In forming that identification, it is critical that law professors remain 
aware of the roles they serve to students as mentor, inspiration, and 
counselor, to name a few.13 Similarly, important in the formation of 
this identity is the need to recognize there are obligations, ethically 
and morally, to students both inside and outside the classroom (includ-
ing how we comport ourselves as faculty members—governance, pol-
icy implications, collegiality, etc.). In addition, occupying a unique po-
sition “between the academy and the legal profession,”14 as law 
 
 9.  Jan Bisset & Margi Heinen, Facing the New Normal, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2013 (Maga-
zine), at 52. 
 10.  For an in-depth discussions regarding the new demographic of law students and the 
impact on law schools, see Courtney G. Lee, Changing Gears to Meet the “New Normal” in 
Legal Education, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 39 (2015). 
 11.  See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012) (arguing that 
law schools cost more than they should resulting in many law students graduating with huge 
debts); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Rethinking the Problem, Reimagining the 
Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2013) (exploring new challenges to legal education, including 
lack of consensus regarding the problem itself, and financial, structural, curricular, and value is-
sues); Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177 
(2012) (examining the reasons for and consequences of the increased cost of legal education in 
the U.S.). 
 12.  See generally Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-
law-schools.html (quoting the dean of Hastings College of the Law at the University of Califor-
nia in San Francisco, Frank Wu: “Law schools will be crushed if they don’t remake them-
selves . . .[t]his is Detroit in the 1970s: change or die.”). 
 13.  See Bruce A. Green, Reflections on the Ethics of Legal Academics: Law Schools as 
MDPS; or, Should Law Professors Practice What They Teach?, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 301, 328–29 
(2001) (noting that law professors have “a strong impulse—and perhaps even a responsibility—
to serve as mentors for students.”). 
 14.  Fallon, Jr., supra note 3, at 246 (noting that a law professor is “poised between the 
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professors, it is important to evaluate and define what role is served in 
the greater legal community. 
This article will undertake to clearly identify and define the roles 
of a law professor in the “new normal” of legal academia in an effort 
to enhance effectiveness and impact on students, colleagues and the 
legal profession as a whole. Part III of the article will discuss “ethics vs. 
morality” as a starting point recognizing that the execution of roles as 
law professors begins with an identity of self. Part IV will explore ob-
ligations to the “new normal” students with Section A discussing com-
petence in teaching, Section B acknowledging the importance of trust-
worthiness in teaching, Section C discussing the roles of mentor and 
counselor, and Section D noting the role in student formation of pro-
fessional identities. Part V will address the obligation to the “new nor-
mal” legal profession as a whole.  Part VI will focus on the obligation 
to the “new normal” law school institution, highlighting the necessity 
to provide institutional leadership in Section A and the importance of 
collegiality in Section B. Part VII provides a conclusion acknowledging 
the importance of meeting all students’ needs (pedagogically, institu-
tionally and professionally) and suggests a normative Code of Conduct 
as an end to such means. 
III. ETHICS VS. MORALITY—A NECESSARY DISTINCTION FOR 
A LAW PROFESSOR’S IDENTITY 
As a starting point to define the role of a law professor it is im-
portant to recognize that identity in a given profession is in great part 
formed by one’s identity of self. It is generally accepted that a student’s 
moral being can be directly affected by legal education.15 Therefore, 
the morals and ethics of those individuals who provide this influential 
education must  necessarily include an examination of the intersection 
of morality, ethics, and professionalism within the context of forming 
a communal identity. Since the focus of this article is on the identity 
of  law professors specifically, the intersection of morality and ethics 
must be explored within that context as the values emanating from law 
 
academy and the legal profession.”).  
 15.  See Jonathan M. Freiman, Steps Toward a Pedagogy of Improvisation in Legal Eth-
ics, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1279, 1284 (1988) (stating that “[l]egal education directly affects 
some individuals’ moral beings.”). 
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professors will be embraced by—and have a direct impact on—law stu-
dents.16 
Typically, the terms “moral” and “ethics” are used synonymously 
in ordinary discourse.17 Philosophers have also used the terms inter-
changeably, with many philosophers distinguishing between the two.18 
Ethics has been defined as “a set of concepts and principles that guide 
us in determining what behavior helps or harms sentient creatures.”19 
Also called “moral philosophy,”20 it has nevertheless been distin-
guished from “morality,” which defines one’s personal character 
through a “set of duties to others (not necessarily just other people) 
that are designed to check our merely self-interested, emotional, or 
sentimental reactions to serious questions of human conduct.”21 In 
general terms, “morals” are the “good” and “ethics” are the rules that 
guide us to that “good.”22 For example, an individual’s moral belief 
may be that murder is “bad” or “immoral.” However, if that individual 
is a lawyer who is bound to defend a person charged with murder, the 
lawyer would, despite any moral beliefs, have an ethical obligation to 
zealously advocate for his client.23 In that sense, morality refers to the 
“domain of what we owe to each other” whereas ethics “refers to the 
 
 16.  This article does not purport to philosophize or expand on the definitions and mean-
ings of “ethics” and “morality.” Rather, the terms as defined in verified literature are used simply 
for the purpose of providing a backdrop to address the individual’s “identity” as it impacts the 
role as a law professor. 
 17.  See, e.g., Ethics Synonyms, MERRIAM-WEBSTER THESAURUS, http://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/thesaurus/ethics (last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (listing “morals” as a synonym for 
“ethics”). See also Fallon, Jr., supra note 3, at 245 (noting that “[i]n ordinary parlance, the terms 
‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are typically used interchangeably.”). 
 18.  Ethics Definition, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (Robert Audi 
ed., 2d ed. 1999) (“‘[Ethics]’ is also commonly used interchangeably with ‘morality’. . . .”). 
 19.  RICHARD PAUL & LINDA ELDER, THE THINKER’S GUIDE TO ETHICAL 
REASONING 2 (2013). 
 20.  See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 
319, 322 (1986–1987) (noting that ethics trace to Immanuel Kant and Enlightenment moral phi-
losophy.). See also BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2 
(7th ed. 2012) (stating that “ethics” is a “branch of moral philosophy.”); Moral Philosophy Defi-
nition, MORALPHILOSOPHY.INFO, http://moralphilosophy.info/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (stat-
ing that “[m]oral philosophy is the area of philosophy concerned with theories of ethics . . . .”). 
 21.  Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1637, 1639 (1988) (stating that morality is “about what we owe, rather than what we are owed, 
except insofar as a sense of entitlement (to happiness, self-fulfillment, an interesting life, the op-
portunity to exercise our talents, or the opportunity to realize ourselves) might generate a duty 
on the part of others to help us get what we are entitled to.”). 
 22.  Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1716 (1976) (noting the view that there is a “viable distinction to be made between 
the ‘right’ (law) and the ‘good’ (morals).”).   
 23.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013). 
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domain of standards bearing on how we ought to live in order to lead 
good or worthy lives.”24 In their book, Ethics for Dummies, Christo-
pher Panza & Adam Potthast simplify ethics and morality as the “sim-
ple concept that can be expressed using the words should and ought.”25 
As Panza & Potthast explain, “‘[g]ood’ or ‘right’ actions are actions 
that you ought to do,” while “‘[b]ad’ character traits are ones you 
should try not to develop,” and “‘[e]vil’ traits are those you should re-
ally try to avoid.”26 
Another main difference in the terms “ethics” and “morals” can be 
traced to word origin. The word “ethics” is derived from the Greek 
word “ethos” meaning “moral character, nature, disposition, habit, 
custom.”27 “Moral” is derived from the Latin word “moralis,” meaning 
“proper behavior of a person in society,”28 with further roots in the 
Latin word “mos” meaning “one’s habit, custom or manner.”29 Philos-
ophers have further distinguished various ethical theories such as “vir-
tue ethics” (as described by Socrates and Aristotle),30 utilitarianism 
(grounded in the “greatest happiness principle” as coined by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stewart Mills),31 and consequentialism,32 to name a 
few. These philosophic terms include variations of altruism and ego-
ism in assessing an individual’s moral and ethical behavior.33 
Each law professor enters academia with an established set of his 
 
 24.  See Fallon, Jr., supra note 3, at 245 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 13–15 (2011)). 
 25.  CHRISTOPHER PANZA & ADAM POTTHAST, ETHICS FOR DUMMIES 10 (2010) (Ital-
ics added).  
 26.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 27.  Ethos Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ethos (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 28.  Moral Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/moral 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 29.  Mos Definition, THE LATIN DICTIONARY, http://latindictionary.wiki-
dot.com/noun:mos (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).  
 30.  MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 125–27. 
 31.  Id. at 53–55. In utilitarian reasoning, a comparison is made between the benefits and 
costs of each action. To do this, the actor must take into account the totality of consequences; as 
opposed to Egoism—what is best for me; or Altruism—what is best for others. To determine the 
totality of consequences, the actor would consider the pleasure impact—measuring the intensity, 
duration, fruitfulness, and likelihood of pleasure that will result from an act or policy.  
 32.  A term coined by G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1, 12 
(1958) (explaining that one must “estimate the badness in the light of the consequences you ex-
pect” and coining the term “consequentialism.”).  
 33.  For example, the notion of “altruism” was coined in the 19th century by philosopher, 
Auguste Comte and is considered a traditional virtue in most societies. See Altruism Definition, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2012). 
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or her own moral values and ethical beliefs: a “moral identity.”34 The 
exercise of one’s moral identity dictates and affects interpersonal rela-
tionships. In a professional learning environment, this moral identity 
must necessarily conform to certain ethical standards of the general 
law school community. Oftentimes, the conformance (or lack thereof) 
is directly reflected in the level of professionalism exhibited.35 Empir-
ical evidence indicates that the issue of professionalism is inexplicably 
“linked to a lawyer’s moral core or moral compass, and includes a deep 
commitment to clients, colleagues, the firm, and broader society.”36 
The lawyer professor should recognize that the foundation of this 
moral core is “trustworthiness, which serves to ‘hold together’ the day-
to-day functions . . ., and serves as an important marker in both estab-
lishing and maintaining a lawyer’s credibility and reputation.”37 As the 
researchers noted in their conclusion: “[a] major part of this founda-
tion of trustworthiness is honesty, with self and others. Honesty serves 
also as an internal mechanism that is part of an ongoing practice of 
self-reflection and growth.”38 
Law professors should be aware of individual moral identity and its 
impact on the effectiveness within legal academia. The key to such 
awareness, as noted by Professors Hamilton and Monson, is honesty 
with self and others driven by a commitment to self-reflection and 
growth. The intersection of moral identity, ethical standards, and pro-
fessionalism illustrate the formation of an identity of law professor and 
provide a foundation for discussing the obligations to students, the 
teaching institution, and the legal profession as a whole. 
IV. LAW PROFESSOR’S OBLIGATION TO STUDENTS 
The most recognizable aspect of a law professor’s identity is the 
role of teacher. In that capacity, the law professor has an undisputed 
responsibility to her students to create and disseminate information. 
This responsibility to transmit knowledge39 necessarily requires a high 
 
 34.  “Moral Identity” has been “used to describe a holistic combination of motivational, 
social, emotional, and cognitive capacities that shape our decisions and behavior.” See Neil Ham-
ilton & Verna Monson, Ethical Professional (Trans)Formation: Themes from Interviews About 
Professionalism with Exemplary Lawyers, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 921, 933 (2012) [hereinafter 
Hamilton & Monson]. 
 35.  Id. at 957.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See generally Ciampi, supra note 4, at 897 (noting one of the roles of law professor as 
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level of competence, an accomplished level of teaching, and a commit-
ment and dedication to the enhancement of knowledge. 
A. Competence in Teaching 
A solid level of competence is key in providing an effective teach-
ing methodology. To teach the law is to equip the next generation of 
lawyers with the necessary tools for success. This can be a complex 
endeavor. Yet, it may be a law school’s most “important programmatic 
product.”40 In order to achieve a high level of competence, law profes-
sors must be fully versed in the substance of the subjects they teach and 
possess a commitment and dedication to continued enhancement of 
knowledge in a given field on a global level. Because of the significant 
time and monetary investment made by students in the pursuit of a law 
degree,41 law schools have an obligation to provide competent faculty 
capable of imparting the requisite skills to prepare students for their 
professional lives beyond law school. As one scholar noted, to do oth-
erwise would be “a species of consumer fraud.”42 Teaching, therefore, 
is paramount to the law professor’s identity. Neither the law profes-
sor’s institutional status43 nor the mantra of academic freedom, in 
which many a law professor take great pride, should cloak unfulfilled 
obligations to be an effective teacher, taking into account current so-
cial and societal norms.44 
 
“transmitter of information”). 
 40.  See Bradley Toben, What Should Our Students Justifiably Expect of Us as Teachers?, 
33 U. TOL. L. REV. 221, 231 (2001) (“A law school relies upon each of its faculty members to 
deliver to its students its most important programmatic product—teaching—in a fashion that 
recognizes and reflects the worth of the enterprise.”). 
 41.  The American Bar Association reported that the average cost of law school in 2012 
was $23,214 for a public law school and $40,634 for a private law school. Law School Tuition 
1985–2012, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR REPORT, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admis-
sions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
  42.  Lawrence Rosenthal, Those Who Can’t, Teach: What the Legal Career of John Yoo 
Tells Us About Who Should be Teaching Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 1563, 1632 (2011). 
 43.  See Toben, supra note 40, at 226 (“Tenure cannot be a shield for poor performance 
and lack of engagement in the teaching enterprise.”). 
 44.  See generally Muriel J. Bebeau, Promoting Ethical Development and Professional-
ism: Insights from Educational Research in the Professions, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 366, 369 
(2008) (discussing studies that suggest generational shifts in perceptions of self-importance and 
individual priorities that present challenges for educators concerned with instilling in students a 
sense of responsibility toward others).  
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Teaching generally involves a commitment to ongoing improve-
ment45 and development of teaching skills.46 Because law professors are 
also lawyers, there is an ongoing obligation to keep current with up-
dates in the law in order to ensure mastery in the doctrines and theories 
of the subject matters they teach. In the current “new normal” climate, 
specialized knowledge and its application must be communicated in 
such a way to ensure that students absorb the substance and understand 
the significance of laws and their operation. The law professor should 
remain aware that each student learns differently—be they abstract or 
concrete thinkers; visual or auditory learners. Law professors should 
also be reasonably prolific in the varying types of learning theories such 
as independent learning theory,47 self-directed learning theory,48  
schema theory,49 heuristic learning theory,50 and mastery learning the-
ory.51  As one author noted, “if we understand how law students learn 
 
 45.  Cassandra L. Hill, The Elephant in the Law School Assessment Room: The Role of 
Student Responsibility and Motivating Our Students to Learn, 56 HOW. L.J. 447, 455 (2013) 
(noting that “law professors and law schools always can, and should, do more to improve their 
teaching and student learning . . . .”). 
 46.  For scholarly articles regarding teaching suggestions and insights for law school pro-
fessors, see generally Paul T. Wangerin, Teaching and Learning in Law School: An “Alternative” 
Bookshelf for Law School Teachers, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 49, 50 (1994) (suggesting that teachers 
develop an alternate bookshelf that contains materials on teaching and learning and offers several 
works); GERALD F. HESS & STEVEN FRIEDLAND, TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAW (1999); 
HOWARD E. KATZ & KEVIN FRANCIS O’NEIL, STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES OF LAW 
SCHOOL TEACHING: A PRIMER FOR NEW (AND NOT SO NEW) PROFESSORS (2009); 
MADELEINE SCHACHTER, THE LAW PROFESSOR’S HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
TEACHING LAW (2004); MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, 
TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN: ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE FINAL 
EXAM 169–87 (2009).  
 47.  Independent learning theory subscribes to the idea that students should be trained to 
become independent from teachers. See generally Jane H. Aiken et al., The Learning Contract 
in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REV. 1047 (1985) (discussing individualized learning); Charles L. 
Finke, Affirmative Action in Law School Academic Support Programs, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 
58 (1989).  
 48.  Self-directed learning theory encourages the adult student learner to take increased 
responsibility for learning—and thereby move away from a passive recipient mode. See generally 
Stephen Brookfield, Self-Directed Learning: A Critical Review of Research, in SELF-DIRECTED 
LEARNING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION 
5, 11 (Stephen Brookfield ed., 1985). 
 49.  Schema theory argues true understanding occurs when incoming information is bro-
ken down and patterned into a structure or a schema. See generally John B. Mitchell, Current 
Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal 
Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275 (1989). 
 50.  Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational 
Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 682–85 (1994) 
(discussing the various forms of learning theory).  
 51.  Mastery Learning Theory is a concept of achievable, widespread excellence. The the-
ory is that “with little more investment of time and resources than we now make, we can create 
BOOTHE-PERRY.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  8:57 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
62 
we can teach to their learning styles and produce better students.”52 
Current technological advances should therefore be taken into ac-
count, recognizing the impact of those advances on different student 
learning styles, and the ability of students to gain the necessary 
knowledge and skills to be effective members of the legal community. 
For many “new normal” law students, “the only world they have 
ever known has been digital.”53 As one scholar aptly noted, these stu-
dents “have always had cable, have never really thought of ‘cookies’ 
and ‘spam’ as just food items, have never ‘dialed’ a telephone, have 
never had to use a bottle of ‘White Out’—much less had to retype an 
entire page—before handing in a paper,” “have always used ‘Google’ 
as a verb, have probably never ‘rolled down’ a car window, [and] have 
never thought that ‘off the hook’ had anything to do with a tele-
phone . . . .”54 These “digital natives”55 think and process information 
“fundamentally differently from their predecessors.”56  Many of them 
show deficiencies in basic critical reading, thinking, analysis, and writ-
ing skills.57 It is imperative that law professors understand how these 
students learn and keep abreast of technology used by students and 
technology available for use in the classrooms. Law professors should 
remain amenable to incorporating “new and varied approaches to the 
traditional lecture in order to engage students.”58 Student engagement 
is a critical adaptation to the learning style of the current generation 
 
an instructional environment in which virtually all students can and will learn well most of what 
we have to teach them.” Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 
896 (1985).  
 52.  Roach, supra note 50, at 682. 
 53.  Samantha A. Moppett, Control-Alt-Incomplete? Using Technology to Assess “Digi-
tal Natives,” 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 77, 79 (2013). 
 54.  Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shift-
ing?, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 913 (2009). 
 55.  The term “digital natives” has been used to describe those that were “born after 1980, 
when social digital technologies, such as Usenet and bulletin board systems, came online.” JOHN 
PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF 
DIGITAL NATIVES 1 (2008). 
 56.  Moppett, supra note 53, at 79 (citing FRANCES JACOBSEN HARRIS, I FOUND IT ON 
THE INTERNET: COMING OF AGE ONLINE viii (2005)). See also Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper 
Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Stu-
dents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (“Students entering law school today differ from 
their predecessors of twenty years ago because they are very technology savvy.”). 
 57.  Nancy B. Rappaport, Changing the Modal Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Edu-
cation in (Most) Schools, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1119, 1143–44 (2012). 
 58.  Broussard, supra note 54, at 913–14 (stating that “law professors need to be prepared 
to incorporate new and varied approaches to the traditional lecture in order to engage their stu-
dents” because “[d]efending traditional pedagogical approaches will become increasingly diffi-
cult”).  
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of digital natives. In 2012, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Sec-
tion on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Standards Review 
Committee proposed revisions to the Standards for Approval for Law 
Schools (“Accreditation Standards”) to shift from traditional input 
measures and instead emphasize outcome measures.59 With the focus 
on outcome measures, the law professor’s role is not simply to transfer 
information to the students.60 Rather, the focus is on what the students 
have learned from the educational experience.61 These outcome 
measures will therefore depend on the ability of the law professor to 
address her student’s learning styles and abilities, and adjust teaching 
methods accordingly. 
B. Trustworthiness In Teaching 
As with any effective teaching, there must also be a necessary ele-
ment of trustworthiness.62 As one scholar noted, “[a]lthough there are 
many ways to teach well, successful teaching of any kind requires 
trust. . . . [Trust that is deserved by] tak[ing] personal responsibility for 
the accuracy or sincerity”63 in interactions with students. This element 
of trustworthiness develops in the classroom. A good teacher will 
therefore foster a classroom environment conducive to learning. Stud-
ies suggest that creating a learning environment64 is so critical to the 
success of learners that no other technique we use as educators will be 
effective without first addressing this.65 
Scholarly research and articles have delved into the impact of the 
classroom atmosphere on child-student learning.66  Research suggests, 
 
 59.  See ABA SEC. LEG. EDUC. & ADMIS. TO B., STANDARDS REVIEW COMMITTEE, 
STANDARDS REVIEW DOCUMENTS CHAPTERS 1–7 (2011). See also Susan Hanley Duncan, The 
New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to a Law School Near You—What You Need to 
Know About Learning Outcomes & Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
605, 608 (2010). 
 60.  Moppett, supra note 53, at n. 31 (citing Robert B. Barr & John Tagg, From Teaching 
to Learning, CHANGE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 13, 16, 19–20). 
 61.  See BARBARA E. WALVOORD, ASSESSMENT CLEAR AND SIMPLE 3 (2004). 
 62.  Fallon, Jr., supra note 3, at 247.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  A “learning environment” has been defined as “all of the physical surroundings, psy-
chological or emotional conditions, and social or cultural influences affecting the growth and 
development of an adult engaged in an educational enterprise.” Roger Hiemstra, Aspects of Ef-
fective Learning Environments, in CREATING ENVIRONMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE ADULT 
LEARNING 5, 8 (Roger Hiemstra ed., 1991). 
 65.  See generally D.W. TILESTON, TEN BEST TEACHING PRACTICES (2000).  
 66.  See, e.g., Xinyi Wu, Intrinsic Motivation and Young Language Learners: The Impact 
Of the Classroom Environment, 31 SYSTEM 501 (2003); Letty J. Rayneri, Brian L. Gerber, & 
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however, that although adult learners are different from children in 
many respects, they have many characteristics that are not dissimilar 
from children.67 When a student (child or adult) has a lot on his or her 
mind, such as problems causing anxiety, little space is left for learning 
activities, and the usual result is ineffective learning.68 By its nature, 
law school creates an atmosphere that can foster anxiety. As one 
scholar put it, “the stresses of attending law school are legendary.”69 
Large amounts of reading, a heavy workload, grades, and competition 
for class placement create “major stressors.”70 When additional stress-
ors are unnecessarily encountered in the learning environment, the 
consequences can prove devastating, resulting in a significant decline 
in a student’s well-being, including anxiety, panic attacks, depression, 
substance abuse, and suicide.71 The gravity of these effects underscores 
the importance for creation of a classroom environment conducive to 
learning. One study conducted to determine categories most influen-
tial on learning environments72 revealed that among the most influen-
tial categories, many involved social and emotional elements in learn-
ing (e.g. student-teacher social interactions, classroom climate, peer 
 
Larry P. Wiley, The Relationship Between Classroom Environment and the Learning Style Pref-
erences Of Gifted Middle School Students and the Impact On Levels Of Performance, 50 
GIFTED CHILD Q. 104 (2006); James E. Tarr, et al. The Impact Of Middle-Grades Mathematics 
Curricula and the Classroom Learning Environment On Student Achievement, 39 J. FOR RES. 
MATHEMATICS EDUC. 247 (2008); Yin Cheong Cheng, Classroom Environment and Student 
Affective Performance: An Effective Profile, 62 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 221 (1994); Barry C. 
Dart, et al. Students’ Conceptions of Learning, the Classroom Environment, and Approaches to 
Learning.  93 J. OF EDUC. RES. 262 (2000). 
 67.  See generally MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, ELWOOD F. HOLTON & RICHARD A. 
SWANSON, THE ADULT LEARNER: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC IN ADULT EDUCATION AND 
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 2005) (discussing the classical theory of andragogy 
theory in adult learning and recognizing the difference and similarities between adult and child 
learning). 
 68.  KATHERINE A. GREENBERG, THE COGNITIVE ENRICHMENT ADVANTAGE 
TEACHER HANDBOOK 69 (2000). 
 69.  Debra S. Austin, Killing Them Softly: Neuroscience Reveals How Brain Cells Die 
From Law School Stress and How Neural Self-Hacking Can Optimize Cognitive Performance, 
59 LOYOLA L. REV. 791, 794 (2014). 
 70.  REBECCA NERISON, LAWYERS, ANGER & ANXIETY: DEALING WITH THE STRESSES 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 68 (2010). 
 71.  NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD 
LIFE IN THE LAW 6–8 (2010); DOUGLAS LITOWITZ, THE DESTRUCTION OF YOUNG LAWYERS 
BEYOND ONE L 16–26 (2006); NERISON, supra note 70, at 15–39; Corie Rosen, The Method 
and the Message, 12 NEV. L.J. 160, 161 (2011). 
 72.  Margaret C. Wang, Geneva D. Haertel, & Herbert J. Walberg, What Influences 
Learning? A Content Analysis of Review Literature, 2 J. OF EDUC. RES. 91 (1997). 
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group).73 Classroom management and climate, and student-teacher in-
teractions directly correlated to effective instruction.74 As an instruc-
tor, facilitating learning and the content of what is offered cannot be 
separated from the social environment in which it is offered. The re-
search supports that a good “teacher,” therefore, must necessarily also 
create and provide a conducive learning environment. As the AAUP 
Statement of Ethics states: 
As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their 
students. They hold before them the best scholarly and ethical stand-
ards of their discipline. Professors demonstrate respect for students 
as individuals and adhere to their proper roles as intellectual guides 
and counselors. Professors make every reasonable effort to foster 
honest academic conduct and to ensure that their evaluations of stu-
dents reflect each student’s true merit. They respect the confidential 
nature of the relationship between professor and student. They avoid 
any exploitation, harassment, or discriminatory treatment of stu-
dents. They acknowledge significant academic or scholarly assistance 
from them.75 
To create or foster a classroom environment with social or emo-
tional stressors is unnecessary to the practice of law and could do a 
grave disservice to students, hindering their ability to do what they at-
tend law school to do: learn the law. The mantra of “academic free-
dom” cannot be used to cloak behavior that is detrimental to the ad-
vancement of students. Certainly law professors should, as one author 
notes, “honor academic freedom as a great and indispensable value be-
cause it serves the values of understanding, knowledge, and truth that 
are greater still.”76 However, the “freedom” granted through academic 
freedom cannot be boundless. Particularly where any lack of bounda-
ries will serve as an instrument to permit abuse and belittling of stu-
dents and generate an unhealthy learning climate. Creating an envi-
ronment conducive to learning will encompass the necessary 
obligation of trustworthiness. 
 
 73.  Id. at 94. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  AAUP, Statement of Professional Ethics, http://www.aaup.org/report/statement-
professional-ethics (last accessed Sept. 9, 2016) (emphasis added). The Statement was originally 
adopted in 1966. Revisions were made and approved by the Association’s Council in 1987 and 
2009. 
 76.  Robert George, Why Academic Freedom Matters (Now More Than Ever), 
INTERCOLLEGIATE R. (May 19, 2014), http://www.intercollegiatereview.com/in-
dex.php/2014/05/19/why-academic-freedom-matters-now-more-than-ever/.  
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C. Teacher as Mentor and Counselor 
Trustworthiness is also foundationally critical as it pertains to two 
interrelated roles of a law professor: that of 1) mentor and 2) counse-
lor.77 These roles become particularly highlighted where the law pro-
fessor is  a member of a historically underrepresented category of pro-
fessors, or teaches in an institution where the mission, in whole or in 
part, is committed to racial and ethnic diversity in the legal profession 
as it relates to the students, the institution, and the profession of law 
as a whole.78 
Although institutions of higher learning in the United States have 
become increasingly diverse over the past few decades,79 as one re-
nowned scholar points out, there is still a “long way to go.”80 Empirical 
evidence indicates that the demographic makeup of law faculties com-
pared to the larger pools of lawyers and the general public has in-
creased in recent years.81 
However, of the over 9,000 law professors82 in the United States, 
the percentages of those who would consider themselves members of 
an underrepresented class defined by gender or race are small. For ex-
ample, a 2013 survey indicated that about 38.6% of all full-time law 
 
 77.  Fallon, Jr., supra note 3, at 247 (noting that “[t]he role of teacher carries especially 
enhanced obligations of trustworthiness in counseling students about what to do or believe”). 
 78.  This article only generally addresses the law professor’s role where diversity in legal 
academia and in law schools is an issue.  
 79.  The Department of Education’s, National Center for Education Statistics reported a 
55.78% increase between 1997 and 2013 in the number of racial minorities who held faculty 
positions at colleges and universities. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, INSTITUTE OF 
EDUCATION SCIENCES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Digest of Educa-
tion Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest (last visited November. 14, 2016) (the DOE 
Table 230 reported that 27,723 of full-time faculty were minorities in 2007. In 2013, the number 
reportedly rose to 43,188 (Table 315.20)). See also Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, Complimentary 
Discrimination and Complementary Discrimination in Faculty Hiring, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 763, 
770 (2010) (noting statistics that “between 1993 and 2003, the percentage of underrepresented 
minority faculty at “four-year institutions grew only 2% nationally, from approximately 6% to 
8%.”). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 128 (2016) (in examining which racial, gender, religious, and political groups 
were the most under- and overrepresented in 1997 and in 2013 compared to persons of similar 
ages in larger pools, the author determines that over the years of the study, minority groups 
moved from being underrepresented to being overrepresented in law teaching compared to the 
legal profession.). 
 82.  About, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.aals.org/about.php 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (The AALS is a non-profit educational association of 176 law schools 
representing over 9,000 law faculty in the United States). 
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faculty (male and female) and 36.6% of all tenured faculty were minor-
ities, with African-American professors making up the largest minority 
group (19.7%).83 Statistics further reveal that by 2013,  women com-
prised only 33.8% of all full-time law faculty in the United States.84 
Only 16.3% of all tenured law professors were women.85  
Students belonging to similarly underrepresented classes statisti-
cally have lower Law School Admission Test scores and other low in-
dicators of ability to succeed.86 Oftentimes these students do not come 
from families or communities with any firsthand knowledge of the ri-
gors and demands of a law school curriculum, and, without a fully-
aware support system, the students have a more difficult time adjusting 
to law school than their majority counterparts.87 Empirical evidence 
indicates that students of color and other non-traditional students are 
more likely than their white counterparts to suffer from isolation dur-
ing their law school tenure, contributing to low academic perfor-
mance, low self-esteem, low motivation, and increased psychological 
ramifications.88 For these students, the role of mentor and counselor 
becomes particularly important—not just for those professors who 
share the same identifiable characteristics of the students, but for all 
professors who have the opportunity to teach any of these students. 
Critics may argue that all law students should be provided the same 
level of support from faculty and that saying there is a higher respon-
sibility to underrepresented groups of students has the appearance of 
 
 83.  Elizabeth Mertz, et. al., After Tenure: Post-Tenure Law Professors in the United 
States, AM. BAR FOUND. 36 (2011), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/up-
loads/cms/documents/after_tenure_report-_final-_abf_4.1.pdf. (last visited November 14, 2016) 
See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Law School Staff by Gender and Ethnicity, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admis-
sions_to_the_bar/statistics/2013_law_school_staff_gender_ethnicity.xlsx (last visited November 
14, 2016). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See generally David M. White, The Requirement of Race-Conscious Evaluation of 
LSAT Score for Equitable Law School Admissions, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 399, 401–05 
(2001) (discussing, generally, the LSAT “score gap” between minority and non-minority law ap-
plicants and citing statistics that indicate that the LSAT produces a discriminatory impact signif-
icantly greater than can be accounted for on the basis of prior academic achievement). 
 87.  See generally Ostrom, supra note 2, at 540 (noting that “[f]or many law students, their 
first encounter with a member of the legal profession occurs at law school,” and that even though 
we “come across lawyers and judges in our everyday lives . . . for first-year law students who have 
taken the initial step in pursuing a legal career, often the law professor is the first person with 
legal authority they personally encounter”). 
 88.  Roach, supra note 50, at 675–77. 
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unequal treatment or unfair bias. Acknowledging the strength and eq-
uity of the “equal opportunity” argument, the simple reality is that 
provision of support via mentoring and counseling is merely a tool cre-
ating an “equal” base for those underrepresented students. This is not 
to suggest that a law professor must actively seek out students to pro-
vide mentoring/counseling or that a law professor should engage in a 
system of spoon-feeding or handholding. Rather, it is a simple 
acknowledgement of the responsibility of the law professor to provide 
such mentoring/counseling as necessary and when solicited, at the very 
least. 
D. Role in Student Formation of Professional Identity 
As a mentor/counselor to all students, a law professor plays a crit-
ical role in helping students form their own moral identities: a concept 
used to describe “a holistic combination of motivational, social, emo-
tional, and cognitive capacities that shape our decisions and behav-
ior.”89 The majority of students attending law school are adults with 
pre-conceived notions of the law, habitual behavior traits, and estab-
lished moral beliefs and virtues.90 In fact, scholars who have studied 
ethical identity and formation in law students have observed that 
“some law students arrive with a clear sense of purpose—of profession-
alism as living one’s ethics and values through the practice of law; and 
others arrive with more pragmatic motivations—of a lucrative career 
accompanied by some authority and autonomy.”91 Yet, despite any es-
tablished beliefs and identity, evidence supports that an individual’s 
identity—call it ethical, moral, or virtuous—can be enhanced and im-
proved throughout one’s life. “[M]oral development was a matter of 
learning the norms of one’s culture, of accepting them and internaliz-
ing them, and of behaving in conformity to them.”92 Research indicates 
 
 89.  Hamilton & Monson, supra note 34, at 933. 
 90.  Timothy W. Floyd, Moral Vision, Moral Courage, and the Formation of the Law-
yer’s Professional Identity, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 339, 347 (2009) (noting that many believe that 
law students are adults whose ethics and values are fully formed and relatively immutable once 
they come to law school). 
 91.  Verna Monson & Neil Hamilton, Entering Law Students’ Conceptions of an Ethical 
Professional Identity and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 385, 391 (2011).   
 92.  JAMES R. REST & DARCIA NARVÁEZ, MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS 2 (1994). 
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that despite this foundational morality,  adults can, in fact, change eth-
ically.93 Other research and analysis has shown that educational pro-
grams that are “continually refined . . . can foster an identity that is 
grounded in the public purposes, core values and ideals of a profes-
sion.”94 
In 2007, a study on legal education by the Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching reported that although law schools 
shape “the minds and hearts of their graduates,”95  law schools are “es-
pecially salient in the development of professional purpose and iden-
tity.”96 The Carnegie report further noted, 
Although some people believe that law school cannot affect students’ 
values or ethical perspectives, in our view law school cannot help but 
affect them. For better or worse, the law school years constitute a 
powerful moral apprenticeship, whether or not this is intentional. 
Law schools play an important role in shaping students’ values, habits 
of mind, perceptions, and interpretations of the legal world, as well 
as their understanding of their roles and responsibilities as lawyers 
and the criteria by which they define and evaluate professional suc-
cess.97 
In part due to the Carnegie Report, more scholars have sounded 
the call to law professors to recognize their vocation as a “unique op-
portunity and . . . obligation to show students the direction to human-
ity and to responsibility,”98 and noted that the “focus on professional 
identity and integrity must be intentional, it must be pervasive, and it 
must start in the first year.”99 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
has also recognized the importance of this particular aspect of a law 
 
 93.  See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral 
Judgment, 70 J. PHIL., Oct. 25, 1973, at 630–31 (outlining the six stages of moral judgment in-
dicating that logic and morality develop through constructive stages); see also Neil Hamilton, 
Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an Ethical Professional Iden-
tity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470, 482 (2008) (Professor Hamilton’s model of professionalism in-
dicates that ethical identity can be developed across one’s lifespan); see generally JAMES REST, 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY (1986).  
 94.  Bebeau, supra note 44, at 367.  
 95.  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 129 (2007). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted). 
 98.  Ciampi, supra note 4, at 883 (charging American law schools to teach law students 
that lawyers “can and must answer their call to humanity in the profession and to responsibility 
in the community”). 
 99.  Floyd, supra note 90, at 348 (providing a detailed example of one school’s efforts to 
cultivate professional identity). 
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professor’s role.100 In July 2011, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education 
proposed changes regarding professionalism to Accreditation Standard 
302 on Learning Outcomes.101 The proposed changes require the 
learning outcomes for each accredited law school to include compe-
tency as an entry-level practitioner as stated in the following areas: 
The professional skills of . . . (ii) the exercise of professional judg-
ment consistent with the values of the legal profession and profes-
sional duties to society, including recognizing and resolving ethical 
and other professional dilemmas . . . [and] knowledge and under-
standing of the following values: . . .  (ii) the legal profession’s values 
of justice, fairness, candor, honesty, integrity, professionalism, re-
spect for diversity and respect for the rule of law . . . .102 
These proposed changes evidence the profession’s recognition of 
the need for law schools to play a more active role in fostering each 
student’s “ethical professional identity.”103 The recognition of the 
need for law professors to do more to “foster each student’s ethical 
professional identity”104 has resulted in a proposed paradigm shift in 
legal education.105 Using empirical evidence, Professors Neil Hamil-
ton and Verna Monson supported the proposal of a: 
. . . shift from a static definition of professionalism and ethical pro-
fessional identity, focused on ethics education about the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, to a constructive developmental definition 
that emphasizes also fostering each student’s moral core of responsi-
bility to others, trustworthiness and honesty, independent counsel to 
clients, and habits of seeking feedback, reflection, and self-assess-
ment.106 
The law professor’s important role in this process of developing a 
moral core is critical to the development of the student-lawyer—both 
 
 100. See Draft for July Meeting, Program of Legal Education, A.B.A. (July 9, 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/commit-
tees/standards_review_documents/july2011meeting/20110621_ch_3_program_of_legal_educa-
tion_redlined_to_standards.authcheckdam.pdf; Draft for April Meeting, Program of Legal Edu-
cation, A.B.A. (April 2-3, 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/commit-
tees/standards_review_documents/april_2011_meeting/report_of_subcommittee_on_stu-
dent_learning_outcomes_redline_to_january_2011_draft.authcheckdam.pdf.   
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
 103.  See Hamilton & Monson, supra note 34 at 924–26.  
 104.  Id. at 923. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 963. 
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as a professional and as a humane member of society.107 
V.  OBLIGATIONS TO LEGAL PROFESSION 
With a substantial amount of time and energy dedicated to ful-
filling the obligations to students and law schools, law professors may 
hold the belief that they are ensconced in institutional cocoons: iso-
lated and separated from the practicing bar and greater legal commu-
nity. Certainly there is a percentage of law professors who have never 
practiced law108 and another slightly higher percentage whose tenure 
in the practice was brief, and who do not maintain active licenses as 
members of a state bar.109 Nevertheless, as the molders and teachers of 
future lawyers, law professors are inescapably an intricate part of the 
legal profession. Those law professors who are also members of a state 
bar are subject to the ethical rules that govern the relevant jurisdiction. 
Law professors who are not bar members should nevertheless adhere 
to the ethical rules, in addition to maintaining compliance with appli-
cable professional standards. It is unfortunate when  “[l]egal educators 
and practicing lawyers [view] themselves as being separated by a ‘gap’” 
instead of recognizing that  “they are engaged in a common enter-
prise—the education and professional development of the members of 
a great profession.”110 Beyond the duties of teaching our students, fur-
thering scholarly pursuits, and ensuring the substantive competence of 
tomorrow’s lawyers, law professors have a broader obligation in this 
 
 107.  Ciampi, supra note 4, at 896 (noting that the “effective selection of the profession the 
law professor presents to the student, and how the professor guides the student into the world of 
law, are critical to the professional and humane development of the student-lawyer”). 
 108.  See James M. Dente, Need For More Professors Who Have Practiced Law, 18 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 252 (1969) (noting that many law schools hired as new professors “only those whom 
they consider to be legal scholars [who] are inexperienced recent graduates with good academic 
records and who had published law review articles”).  See also Brent E. Newton, Preaching What 
They Don’t Practice:  Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and De-
valuation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 
105, 126–30 (discussing the limited practice experience of many law professors).  
 109.  See Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the Virtue of In-
trospection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 117, 144 (2001) (noting that “[t]he practice experience of many law pro-
fessors at many prominent law schools will have been brief, and the life and concerns of practice 
soon seem far removed from current intellectual interests, even in the case of those who practiced 
for substantial periods”). 
 110.  See ROBERT MACCRATE ET. AL., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 3 (A.B.A. Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions 
to the Bar ed., 1992) (also known as the “MacCrate Report”), http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_de-
velopment_maccrate_report%29.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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“common enterprise”111 to ensure that the attributes and qualities dis-
played by new lawyers will serve to uphold and enhance the standards 
of the legal profession. Intellectual pursuit cannot be the sole charge 
of the law professor. This obligation to the legal profession is, in a 
sense, inextricably woven with a law professor’s obligation to her stu-
dents. Learning how to respect and relate to others within the practice 
of law should therefore be a part of the mission of legal education112 
and an integral component of the law professor’s role. 
As the law professor fulfills the role in assisting students to form 
an ethical identity discussed previously, it is imperative that the law 
professor acknowledges and addresses challenges articulated by the le-
gal profession. Law is a profession that takes pride in its “professional 
status.”113 Yet, over the years one of the most frequently articulated 
concerns has related to the state of professionalism exhibited by mem-
bers of the legal profession, and the perception of the lack of profes-
sionalism held by the general public.114 Unprofessional behavior ex-
hibited by some members of the legal profession has led to the 
conclusion that attorneys are “fail[ing] to absorb the significance of 
practicing professionalism.”115 This lack of professionalism has been 
aptly noted as a “crisis.”116 Research evidences that law schools can, in 
 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  William J. Rich, Measuring Judicial Success: Interpersonal Intelligence and Commit-
ment to Enduring Values, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 35, 37 (2007) (discussing characteristics of inter-
personal intelligence and self-assurance to determine if law professors should model the charac-
teristics of successful judges).  
 113.  See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Professionalism’s Triple E Query: Is Legal Academia 
Enhancing, Eluding, or Evading Professionalism?, 55 LOYOLA L. REV. 517, 520 (2009) (noting 
that law is a profession that “takes pride in ‘professional status’ and is hypersensitive about its 
image”). 
 114.   See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER 
CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM 17 (1999), http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/micro-
sites/files/ccj/web%20documents/national-action-plan-full.ashx (noting how the unethical and 
unprofessional conduct of a small portion of lawyers has tainted the image of the legal community 
and diminished public confidence in legal and judicial institutions). See also Richard Abel, Book 
Review of Marc Galanter, Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal Culture, 57 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 130 (March 2007); Sullivan & Podgor, supra note 109, at 150 (noting that “[t]he lack of 
public confidence in the value of the legal profession and in the work that lawyers do, together 
with the apparent lack of self-confidence within the profession, are festering problems today.”).  
 115.  See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Enforcement of Law Schools’ Non-Academic Honor 
Codes: A Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 634, 635 (2011). 
 116.   WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND 
& LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 
136–37 (2007) (This “crisis” also includes a decline in the role of the counselor and in lawyers’ 
competence, including ethical competence, and a new “sense of the law as a business, subject to 
greater competitive economic pressures and answerable only to the bottom line.”). 
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fact, promote the development of mature moral thinking in its stu-
dents, which inevitably will result in increased ethical conduct and pro-
fessional behavior.117 
Competence and effectiveness are consistently elicited in defining 
“good” lawyers.118 In addition, empirical data indicates that a lawyer’s 
success and effectiveness is inextricably linked to the lawyer’s profes-
sionalism.119 The ABA has long recognized the importance of “teach-
ing” professionalism, and the law school and law professor’s role to-
wards that end.120 In July 1992, the ABA’s Section on Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar, chaired by Robert MacCrate, issued “An 
Educational Continuum Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and 
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap” (“MacCrate Report”).121 The 
central mission of the MacCrate Report Task Force was twofold.122 
First, the Task Force sought to identify the necessary skills and values 
for lawyers to describe what law schools and the practicing bar were 
doing to advance the professional development of lawyers.123 Second, 
the group was tasked to formulate recommendations on how the legal 
education community and the practicing bar can join together to fulfill 
their respective responsibilities to the profession and the consuming 
public.124 The Task Force concluded in part that it is the responsibility 
of law schools and the practicing bar to make a collected effort in order 
 
 117.  Id. at 133, 135 (noting that “[l]aw school experiences, if they are powerfully engaging, 
have the potential to influence the place of moral values such as integrity and social contribution 
in students’ sense of self.”). 
 118.  The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states directly that “[a] 
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession 
and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, Preamble 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). In addition, the Model Rules’ Preamble specifi-
cally requires a lawyer to observe the Model Rules. Id. at Preamble (7), (12), (14). Rule 8.4(a) 
states that it is professional misconduct to violate the Rules, which includes Rule 1.1 on compe-
tence and Rule 1.3 on diligence. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2013). 
 119.  See generally Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship 
of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 139 
(2011). 
 120.  See ROBERT MACCRATE, supra note 110. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 8 (“To identify those skills and values, to describe what law schools and the 
practicing bar are now doing to advance the professional development of lawyers, and to recom-
mend how the legal education community and the practicing bar can join together to fulfill their 
respective responsibilities to the profession and the consuming public has been the central mis-
sion of this Task Force.”) 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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to assist students and lawyers in “developing the skills and values re-
quired” of them to fulfill the responsibilities to the profession and the 
public.125 The Report recommended “enhancing professional develop-
ment during the law school years.”126 The Report further analyzed 
“professional values” and noted that “training in professional respon-
sibility” should involve more than “just the specifics of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct”; it should encompass “the values of the profession,” including 
“the obligations and accountability of a professional dealing with the 
lives and affairs of clients.”127 
A key element of the law professor’s role should involve a commit-
ment to instruct and “train” our students in the principles and stand-
ards of the legal profession. 
VI.  OBLIGATIONS TO INSTITUTION 
The law professor’s individual conscience and commitment to ac-
ademic and holistic growth of law students is a primary role. In addi-
tion, faculty members and administrators of law schools should have a 
“legitimate interest in the maintenance of proper standards of faculty 
responsibility on the part of all members of the academic commu-
nity.”128 The unique mission of higher education (that of creation of 
knowledge and the teaching of the “discipline of dissent”) is the basic 
justification for academic freedom129 and also shared governance.130 
Although most administrative duties are fulfilled by administrators in 
law schools (many of whom are law professors themselves), the faculty 
 
 125.  Id. at 8. 
 126.  Id. at 327, 330. 
 127. Id. at 135–36 (quoting Robert B. McKay, What Law Schools Can and Should Do (and 
Sometimes Do), 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 491, 509–10 (1985). 
 128.  Neil Hamilton, The Ethics of Peer Review in the Academic and Legal Professions, 
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 243–44 (2001) (quoting American Association of University Professors, 
Academic Responsibility: Comments by Members of Committee A Incident to Consideration of 
the Koch Case, 49 AAUP BULL. 40, 40 (1963)). 
 129.  Id. at 233 (describing “academic freedom” as a “tradition where college and university 
employers, acknowledging higher education’s unique mission of creating knowledge and teach-
ing the discipline of dissent, have granted exceptional vocational freedom of speech to professors 
in research, teaching, and extramural utterance.”). 
 130.  Id. at 232 (quoting Eric Ashby, A HIPPOCRATIC OATH FOR THE ACADEMIC 
PROFESSION, 7 Minerva 64, 65 (1968–1969).  
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as a whole retains substantial collective responsibility to provide insti-
tutional leadership.131 This leadership can only be accomplished effec-
tively in the face of collegial behavior. 
A. Provision of Institutional Leadership 
The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) 
Statement of Professional Ethics reinforces the importance of this as-
pect of a law professor’s role. The AAUP’s stated mission is to “ad-
vance academic freedom and shared governance, to define fundamen-
tal professional values and standards for higher education, and to 
ensure higher education’s contribution to the common good.”132 In its 
“Statement of Professional Ethics,” the AAUP states that professors 
must “accept their share of faculty responsibilities for the governance 
of their institution.”133 This necessitates that the law professor partic-
 
 131.  American Association of Law Schools Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors 
in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, http://www.aals.org/mem-
bers/other-member-services/aals-statements/ethics/ (membership log-in needed). See also AALS 
Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their Ethical and Professional 
Responsibilities, WASHBURN UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW (Nov. 17, 1989), http://wash-
burnlaw.edu/facultystaff/otherpolicies/aalsgoodpractices.html (stating that “[l]aw professors 
have a responsibility to participate in the governance of their university and particularly the law 
school itself. Although many duties within modern universities are assumed by professional ad-
ministrators, the faculty retains substantial collective responsibility to provide institutional lead-
ership. Individual professors have a responsibility to assume a fair share of that leadership, in-
cluding the duty to serve on faculty committees and to participate in faculty deliberations.”). See 
also Gene A. Marsh, ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TEACHING CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAW, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 16 (2006). 
 132.  Mission, AAUP, http://www.aaup.org/about/mission-description (last visited Sept. 24, 
2016). 
 133.   Statement on Professional Ethics, AAUP (1966), http://www.aaup.org/report/state-
ment-professional-ethics. (This statement was originally adopted in 1966 and later adopted by 
the AAUP’s Council in 1987.).  
The Statement [reads]: 
1. Professors, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advance-
ment of knowledge, recognize the special responsibilities placed upon them. 
Their primary responsibility to their subject is to seek and to state the truth as 
they see it. To this end, professors devote their energies to developing and im-
proving their scholarly competence. They accept the obligation to exercise crit-
ical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending, and transmitting 
knowledge. They practice intellectual honesty. Although professors may follow 
subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise 
their freedom of inquiry. 
2. As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their students. 
They hold before them the best scholarly and ethical standards of their discipline. 
Professors demonstrate respect for students as individuals and adhere to their 
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ipates in the governance of both the law school and the parent univer-
sity by serving on faculty committees and participating in faculty de-
liberations. This encompasses both matters of academic concern and 
any other issues of institutional policy.134 Some law school faculty and 
committee meetings might oftentimes want for social or intellectual 
stimulation, or elicit a sense of déjà vu.135 Nevertheless, consistent and 
active participation in these endeavors is an inescapable obligation of 
the law professor. Law professors should be able to contribute to the 
 
proper roles as intellectual guides and counselors. Professors make every reason-
able effort to foster honest academic conduct and to ensure that their evaluations 
of students reflect each student’s true merit. They respect the confidential nature 
of the relationship between professor and student. They avoid any exploitation, 
harassment, or discriminatory treatment of students. They acknowledge signifi-
cant academic or scholarly assistance from them. They protect their academic 
freedom. 
3. As colleagues, professors have obligations that derive from common membership 
in the community of scholars. Professors do not discriminate against or harass 
colleagues. They respect and defend the free inquiry of associates, even when it 
leads to findings and conclusions that differ from their own. Professors 
acknowledge academic debt and strive to be objective in their professional judg-
ment of colleagues. Professors accept their share of faculty responsibilities for 
the governance of their institution. 
4. As members of an academic institution, professors seek above all to be effective 
teachers and scholars. Although professors observe the stated regulations of the 
institution, provided the regulations do not contravene academic freedom, they 
maintain their right to criticize and seek revision. Professors give due regard to 
their paramount responsibilities within their institution in determining the 
amount and character of work done outside it. When considering the interrup-
tion or termination of their service, professors recognize the effect of their deci-
sion upon the program of the institution and give due notice of their intentions. 
5. As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of 
other citizens. Professors measure the urgency of these obligations in the light of 
their responsibilities to their subject, to their students, to their profession, and to 
their institution. When they speak or act as private persons, they avoid creating 
the impression of speaking or acting for their college or university. As citizens 
engaged in a profession that depends upon freedom for its health and integrity, 
professors have a particular obligation to promote conditions of free inquiry and 
to further public understanding of academic freedom.” 
 134.  See Bylaws, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 
http://www.aals.org/about/handbook/bylaws/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (Section 6-5(a) states 
that “a member school shall vest in the faculty primary responsibility for determining academic 
policy.”). See generally Susan P. Liemer, Hierarchy Of Law School Faculty Meetings: Who 
Votes?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 351, 365 (2004) [hereinafter Liemer] (noting that the AALS does not 
limit faculty to academic matters when it requires that member schools vest faculty with primary 
responsibility for institutional policy). 
 135.  Liemer, supra at 134 at 351 (The author states that “[f]or anyone who has been teach-
ing at an American law school for a few years, the agenda for any given faculty meeting may elicit 
a sense of dejá vù. From time to time the grading system or the honor system will be revisited, 
committees focusing on topics from admissions to graduation will give reports, and the dreaded 
curriculum reform or self-study will resurface.”).  
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dialogue in a productive and efficient manner, refraining from filibus-
ter discourse. Even though we “maintain the right to criticize and seek 
revision,”136 that right should not be exercised to the detriment of col-
leagues or the institution. It is also imperative to recognize that com-
mittees and faculty meetings are not vehicles to promote self-inter-
ested pursuits. Rather, these meetings provide an opportunity for 
collective engagement towards a goal of advancement of the institu-
tion. 
B. Collegiality 
As the Statement of Professional Ethics notes, “[professors should] 
respect and defend the free inquiry of associates, even when it leads to 
findings and conclusions that differ from their own.”137 This “respect” 
for “associates” is key to the law professor’s role both inside and out-
side the law school community.138 
The AAUP notes that “[a]s colleagues, professors have obligations 
that derive from common membership in the community of schol-
ars . . . [and] do not discriminate against or harass colleagues.”139 The 
need for reinforcement of this dictate of collegiality has sparked little 
scholarly interest over the years,140 despite the fact that it is a recurring 
topic of conversation among law school faculty members. Despite re-
search and discourse on the topic, the fully-collegial law school faculty 
 
 136.  Statement on Professional Ethics, supra note 133.  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140. Michael L. Seigel, On Collegiality, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406, 407 (2004) (Professor 
Siegel notes that “though much talked about in academic circles, collegiality has received scant 
attention in academic writing.”). See Neil W. Hamilton, Academic Tradition and the Principles 
of Professional Conduct, 27 J.C. & U.L. 609 (2001); Gregory M. Heiser, “Because the Stakes are 
so Small”: Collegiality, Polemic, and Professionalism in Academic Employment Decisions, 52 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 385 (2004) (analyzing the issue of collegiality from a sociological perspective).   
The literature does evidence articles of collegiality as it deals specifically with its use as a 
factor for the tenure and promotion process.  For in-depth literature on that tangential topic 
regarding collegiality as a factor to be considered in the tenure and promotion process, see gen-
erally Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, The Role of Collegiality in Higher Education 
Tenure, Promotion, and Termination Decisions, 27 J. C. & U. L. 833 (2001) (presenting an 
analysis of the policy arguments for and against consideration of collegiality in higher education 
tenure, promotion, and termination decisions and a review of the relevant case law that discusses 
and analyzes the issue); Edgar Dyer, Collegiality as a Factor in Faculty Employment Decisions 
at Public Colleges and Universities: A Selective Review of the Caselaw, 152 EDUC. L. REP. 455 
(2001); Perry A. Zirkel, Mayberry v. Dees: Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Tenure, 12 
EDUC. L. REP. 1053 (1983).  
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seems to be more of an anomaly than a normalcy in many of our na-
tion’s law schools. Uncollegial behavior remains an invidious evil in 
law school faculty. 
In 2006, Professors Michael L. Seigel and Kami Miner-Rubino 
published preliminary findings of an empirical study of collegiality 
among law professors.141 Of the 8,029 law faculty members solicited, 
1,256 submitted at least a partially completed survey on collegiality.142 
Respondents reported generally positive, but far from ideal, conditions 
at their respective institutions.143 The findings suggested that a mini-
mum level of collegiality is more or less the norm.144 However, the data 
revealed that what “[l]urk[ed] behind the norm” was “a moderate de-
gree of affirmatively uncollegial conduct” occurring on a regular basis 
at most law schools.145  Conduct such as being “[p]ut down” or having 
“been condescending to” was reported by 53.3% of faculty mem-
bers.146 A full 36.5% of respondents reported that a colleague had made 
“insulting or disrespectful remarks” to them at least once during the 
prior year; and a substantial majority (55.5%) claimed that a colleague 
had “interrupted or spoke[n] over” them at least once, with 43.3% con-
tending that this had happened on more than one occasion.147 A num-
ber of survey-takers (38.8%)  claimed to be the victims of “the silent 
treatment” by a colleague one or more times during the previous 
twelve months.148 What might have been more disturbing was the em-
pirical data indicating that lying is a common behavior on law school 
faculties.149 More than a third of the respondents reported to having 
been the direct victim of dishonesty at least once in the previous 
year.150  More rampant was dishonesty in the form of attempting to 
 
 141.  Michael L. Seigel & Kathi Miner-Rubino, Some Preliminary Statistical, Qualitative, 
and Anecdotal Findings of an Empirical Study of Collegiality Among Law Professors, 13 
WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 142.  Id. at 7. 
 143.  Id. at 10–11. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. at 11. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. (31.5% of respondents reported having been the direct victim of dishonesty at least 
once in the last year). 
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influence faculty governance or policy “in an underhanded or dishon-
est way.”151 “Bad faith”152 lobbying for an institutional resource alloca-
tion (e.g., chair, money, faculty appointment) was noted by an even 
greater percentage of respondents.153 Another trend of uncollegiality 
was noted from the 72.2% of survey respondents who claimed to wit-
ness a colleague “[s]hirking committee or other governmental respon-
sibilities.”154 
Although 24% of respondents declared their institutions as a “fun, 
collegial place to work,”155 the uncollegial reports remained glaring, 
with suggested reasons such as the power differential commonly found 
at law schools between the tenured and tenure-track faculty,156  the few 
“bad apples” on the faculty who perpetuate the uncollegial behavior,157 
and an “ineffective (or worse) dean or administration.”158  Smaller per-
centages of comments pointed to uncollegiality stemming from issues 
of discrimination (e.g. sexism, 159 racism,160 and “discrimination against 
white males and/or conservatists;”161); generational divides;162 division 
between “scholars” and “teachers”;163 and “inter-school competition 
for students.”164 
Whatever the root causes, these disturbing statistics indicate that 
the oft-touted and sought-after collegiality in law schools is lacking.165 
 
 151.  Id. (41.4% of respondents reported instances of dishonest influences on faculty gov-
ernance or policy).  
 152.  Id. (defining “bad faith” as conduct performed “for selfish motives as opposed to an 
honest belief in the best interests of the institution”). 
 153.  Id. (citing the percentage as 42.4%). 
 154.  Id. at 12. 
 155.  Id. at 13.  
 156.  Id. at 17. 
 157.  Id. at 19–20 (noting that the statistics support an underlying assumption in his previ-
ous scholarship that most of the problems law schools face in the collegiality arena stem from the 
conduct of a very small minority of extremely difficult faculty members).  
 158.  Id. at 23. 
 159.  Id. at 21 (commenting that the law school is “sexist, either overtly or unconsciously”). 
 160.  Id. at 28–29. 
 161.  Id. at 26. 
 162.  Id. at 28. 
 163.  Id. at 29.  
 164.  Id. at 30.   
 165.  A precise definition of “collegiality” has provided fodder for scholars.  In Mayberry v. 
Dees, the court weighed in on the issue, defining collegiality as “the capacity to relate well and 
constructively to the comparatively small bank of scholars on whom the fate of the university 
rests.” 663 F.2d 502, 514 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982). As Professor Michael 
Seigel notes however, this definition raises more questions than it answers. Questions such as 
“[d]o colleagues truly need to ‘relate well’ to each other? Or was the court suggesting something 
more Machiavellian—that a faculty member needs to get along with his institution’s power-
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Law faculties are subject to the regulations of the institutions at which 
they teach.166 Some institutions include within their teaching or service 
components a requirement that professors  contribute as collegial 
members167 or demonstrate “professional collegiality.”168  Others use 
collegiality as a factor to be considered in the tenure and promotion 
process.169 The court in Mayberry v. Dees recognized the importance 
of collegiality even in the presence of Constitutional rights, stating that 
to the extent that professor’s remarks may tend to diminish collegiality 
of the department, “one may, without offending the Constitution, base 
decision not to recommend tenure on content of remarks, although 
they enjoy First Amendment protection.”170 
Whether or not an institution has specific regulations for faculty 
collegiality,171 law professors must realize that conduct and behavior 
within the institution reflects not only on them as individuals, but more 
importantly on the status and perception of the institution itself. If law 
 
wielding insiders or risk endangering his career?” See Michael L. Seigel, supra note 130, at 410.   
 166.   Marsh, supra note 131, at 15. 
 167.  Auburn University requires that a candidate for tenure demonstrate that he or she 
“contributes as a productive and collegial member of the academic unit in all relevant areas” 
addressing issues such as whether “the candidate’s professional abilities and relationships with 
colleagues [are] compatible with the departmental mission and with its long-term goals? Has the 
candidate exhibited an ability and willingness to engage in shared academic and administrative 
tasks that a departmental group must often perform and to participate with some measure of 
reason and knowledge in discussions germane to departmental policies and programs? Does the 
candidate maintain high standards of professional integrity?” Chapter 3: Faculty Personnel Pol-
icies and Procedures, AUBURN UNIVERSITY, http://www.auburn.edu/academic/provost/facul-
tyHandbook/chapter%203-personnel_policies.html#tenurecriteria (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 168.  Virginia State University’s Criteria for the Award of Tenure to Collegiate/Instruc-
tional Faculty requires the candidate to demonstrate “professional collegiality.” VIRGINA STATE 
UNIVERSITY, TENURE CRITERIA, SECTION 2.5, http://www.vsu.edu/files/docs/faculty-
staff/Tenure.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 169.  See generally Connell & Savage, supra note 140 (presenting an analysis of the policy 
arguments for and against consideration of collegiality in higher education tenure, promotion, 
and termination decisions and a review of the relevant case law that discusses and analyzes the 
issue); Dyer, supra note 140; Zirkel, supra note 140. 
 170.  Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d at 516. 
 171.  Seigel & Miner-Rubino, supra note 141, at 12 (In response to queries regarding in-
stitutional responses to uncollegiality, only 25.8% of respondents reported that their institution 
has “leaders who take quick action to stop even subtle negative comments” while 34.8% reported 
that their law school did not have leaders of this ilk. 40.2% of respondents claimed that their law 
school leaders do not make “strong public statements about the seriousness of uncollegiality.”). 
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professors are not able (or willing) to display “affirmative collegial-
ity”172 or, in other words, to be a “model colleague[];”173 at the very 
least, the behavior must comport with a baseline collegiality as defined 
by Professor Siegel: i.e. “conducting oneself in a manner that does not 
impinge upon the ability of one’s colleagues to do their jobs or on the 
capacity of one’s institution to fulfill its mission.”174 
One role of the law professor involves a commitment to create an 
atmosphere conducive to academic freedom that allows for free dis-
course among professors and with students.175 This would necessitate 
acknowledgement of a common goal towards collaborative and con-
structive cooperation and a commitment to providing honest judg-
ment of a given subject matter, particularly as it relates to issues of 
faculty governance and institutional advancement. Voicing criticism 
and convictions through conscientious, reflective behavior would ad-
here to goals of furthering this governance and advancement of the 
institution. This behavior would encompass the varied definitions of 
collegiality.  As Professor Seigel points out, lack of collegiality is not 
to be confused with “good faith criticism and pressure for change.”176 
The description of “good faith” is tantamount, however, to avoid de-
structive or self-serving behavior which in turn can undermine the pro-
gression and mission of the institution. 
A commitment to a collegial atmosphere in the institution will fos-
ter behavior by law faculty to highlight institutional accomplishments 
and promote the institution. The law professor’s commitment to a 
scholarly agenda and dedication to service within and beyond the law 
school community will also enhance the institution’s external standing. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ABA’s Commission on Professionalism stated that “the law 
 
 172.  Seigel, On Collegiality, supra note 140, at 414 (defining “affirmatively collegial” fac-
ulty as those who “typically go beyond the call of duty in some aspect(s) of their job . . . display 
enthusiasm, dedication, and a constructive attitude, and . . . work hard to foster harmony among 
their peers and to further the mission of their institution.”).   
 173.  Id. at 411. 
 174.   Id. (emphasis omitted) (providing a one sentence definition for “baseline collegial-
ity”). 
 175.   Hamilton, supra note 128, at 240 (noting that the “essential requirement for progress 
in the discovery of knowledge in a university setting is free discourse among academic profes-
sionals within the ethical and competency constraints of a discipline as defined by peers[.]”). 
 176.  Seigel, supra note 140, at 415 (noting that there is a distinction between “legitimate 
activism” and “destructive behavior.”). 
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school experience provides the student’s first exposure to the profes-
sion, and . . . professors inevitably serve as important role models for 
students.”177 The roles that define law professors will directly define 
the behavior that the “new normal” student and the future lawyers of 
America will model. 
As law professors and members of the legal profession, one of the 
primary obligations of the law professor is to ensure that actions inside 
and outside the law school classroom exemplify the standards of the 
profession and exhibit a high degree of professionalism. Perhaps a uni-
form Code of Law Professor Conduct will provide foundational sup-
port to establish such standards.178 To be a role model dictates model-
ing a particular role that one will emulate. Law professors must have a 
clear understanding of the multi-faceted roles in which they are 
cloaked: roles defined by responsibilities to students, institutions, and 
the legal profession, particularly in this current “new normal” climate. 
The attitudes and attributes that society needs and demands from the 
next generation of lawyers must be modeled by those who teach the 
law. 
 
 
 177.  AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 12 (1986). 
 178.  As a starting point, the author proposes, but will not in this article outline, such a 
proposed Code of Conduct.  
